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Abstract Recently, both academia and industry have
initiated research projects directed on integration of P2PSIP
paradigm into communication systems. In this paradigm,
P2P network stores most of the network information on
each participating peer without help of the central servers.
The concept of self-configuration, self-establishment great-
ly improves the robustness of the network system compared
with the traditional Client/Server based systems. In this
paper, we survey P2PSIP solutions proposed recently both
in the academic and industrial research. We consider
technical issues that include Chord overlay topology,
P2PSIP session initiation (including enrollment and boot-
strap, NAT traversal, message routing, P2PSIP interwork-
ing, P2PSIP Client, etc), and security issues. Our survey is
based on recent research publications.
Keywords Peer-to-Peer (P2P) . Session Initiation Protocol
(SIP) . P2PSIP. Chord . Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) .
Pre-Shared Key (PSK) . Chord Secure Proxy (CSP)
1 Introduction
Currently Peer-to-Peer (P2P) computing has attracted great
attention in both academia and industry. Compare with the
traditional server-based system architecture in which most
of the functionality is allocated on the server side, P2P-
based computing spreads computing task among all
participating peers. This might eliminate (at least reduce)
the role of server and therefore provide better robustness for
the system.
In the communication field, the most well-known applica-
tion is Skype [1], which offers free Voice-over-IP (VoIP) and
Instant messaging service for computer-to-computer com-
munication and charged service for computer-to-PSTN
communication. Also, Skype service has been extended to
the mobile world. Many mobile devices today (e.g. Nokia
N800 [2], SonyEricsson P1 [3]), have been embedded Wi-Fi
based Skype application. According to official statistics [1],
the number of Skype users has reached 280 million until
Feb, 2009, and the number is still growing fast at the speed
of 6 million each month.
Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) is designed to create,
modify, and terminate sessions with one or more partic-
ipants. With concrete characteristics (e.g. simplicity, exten-
sibility, flexibility, etc), SIP is chosen by 3rd Generation
Partnership Project (3GPP) as the main protocol for the IP
multimedia Subsystem (IMS)-based future All-IP network
[4]. SIP with respect to future communication systems is
regarded as important as HTTP to the Internet.
P2P computing has begun to infiltrate into SIP communi-
cation systems. The SIPpeer project at Columbia University [5]
and the SOSIMPLE project at William & Mary College [6]
are the first attempt in the study of P2PSIP based communi-
cation system. In the following years, P2PSIP research has
attracted the great attention from both academia and industry.
IETF P2PSIP working group defines the concept and
motivation behind P2PSIP [7]: The concept behind P2PSIP
is to leverage the distributed nature of P2P to allow for
distributed resource discovery in a SIP network, eliminating
(at least reducing) the need for centralized servers.
In the following sections, we give a survey on P2PSIP
based communication systems. Our survey is mainly based








on a few typical research projects (e.g. SIPPeer [5], P2PP
[8], SIPDHT [9], and dSIP [10], etc) and recent research
literature. In Section 2 we introduce the P2PSIP require-
ment; Section 3 specifies Chord-based P2PSIP overlay and
the corresponding improvement; P2PSIP session initiation
services, including enrollment and bootstrap mechanism,
NAT traversal, message routing, P2PSIP interworking,
P2PSIP Client, are described in Section 4. Section 5 is the
introduction of security problems and the corresponding
solutions. Finally, we include conclusions and open issues
in Section 6”.
2 Requirement statement
In this Section, we briefly describe the requirement to P2PSIP
communication system, according to paper [5, 6, 11–13].
1. Availability, Stability and Efficiency. This is the basic
requirement of P2PSIP communication systems.
2. Transport requirement. The designed peer protocol
SHOULD deliver P2PSIP messages reliably and
efficiently.
3. DHT requirement. The designed peer protocol
SHOULD be extensible to accommodate difference
among different overlay technologies (e.g. the existing
Pastory, Kademlia, etc [7, 8]), including new algo-
rithms that might appear in the future.
4. Interworking requirement. P2PSIP protocol SHOULD
interwork with traditional network (e.g. PSTN, etc) and
advanced IP networks (e.g. SIP, IMS, etc).
5. NAT Traversal. Since many devices are behind the
protection of NAT, the designed peer protocol
SHOULD provide efficient NAT traversal mechanisms.
6. P2PSIP Client. The designed peer protocol SHOULD
contain the client protocol to support the legacy devices
that participate the P2PSIP overlay but do not make
contributions due to lack of the support in DHT
algorithm or the limitation of devices capability (e.g.
energy, CPU processing power, bandwidth, etc).
7. Security requirement. Security mechanisms should be
implemented to protect P2PSIP systems from security
breaches, such as malicious or faulty peers.
3 Chord-based P2PSIP overlay
One of the best definition of overlay network is given in
[14]: “An overlay network is virtual network of nodes and
logical links that is built on top of an existing network with
the purpose to implement a network service that is not
available in the existing network”. In the following sub-
section, we specify Chord-based P2PSIP overlay, which has
been suggested as a mandatory overlay to support P2PSIP
communication [5, 6, 11, 13].
3.1 Chord-based overlay
In Chord overlay, peers and resources construct a ring, as
shown in Fig. 1. In the ring, peer and resource are represented
by integer Node ID/Resource ID. Each peer stores a certain
amount of <id, value> pairs, in which id is the peer/resource
ID, value is the peer address information or the data storage.
Peer/resource ID is assigned by consistent hashing [15], e.g.
SHA-1 algorithm, etc. For instance, the peer ID can be
produced by hashing the IP address of the particular peer;
and the resource ID can be generated by hashing the data
value. The Resource ID is stored in the first peer, whose
ID> = Resource ID (see Fig. 2).
Each peer contains a routing table, called Finger table,
for storing the routing information records. The Finger table
records log N successors where N is the number of peers in
the overlay (see Fig. 3). Suppose the space size of overlay
is 2m, for some integer m and the i-th successor ID of a peer
with ID P is:
SuccidðiÞ ¼ P þ 2i1 mod 2m 0 < i  mð Þ
Each peer contacts periodically its successors for updat-
ing the Finger table. It also contacts the predecessor that is
the previous peer in the identifier circle. This is useful when
a peer leaves the ring and asks the previous peer to update
its Finger table.
Chord routes the message by sending messages to the
next successor nearest to the destination identifier. Consider
an example, when peer 3 is searching peer 28 (Fig. 4.). The
peer 3 would first check its finger table records; choose a
successor (peer 22) nearest to the destination, and then send
a request to this successor. The peer 22 would also check its
Fig. 1 Chord ring
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own finger table and forward the message to its successor
(destination peer 28). According to the simulation result in
paper [16], the average path length of Chord is 1/2 logN,
where N is the number of peers in the overlay.
Chord also defines the advertisement function support-
ing joining/leaving procedure for peers. The advertisement
function would tell the corresponding successor and
predecessor to update their finger table.
3.2 Improvement of Chord-based overlay
Many efforts have been done to improve the Chord lookup
efficiency. In the following, we mainly describe three types
of improvement.
One approach is through revising Chord lookup algo-
rithm. For example, BiChord [17] gets the efficiency
improvement by initiating bi-directional lookup request
from source peer. EpiChord [18] proposes that source peer
initiates queries in parallel to p immediate successors and to
p-1 immediate predecessors, where p is a system attribute.
Another improvement is using Cache mechanism to
reduce the delay, as proposed in paper [19, 20]. Cache
records the communication history, e.g. peer ID, public IP,
port, etc. With these information, the session might be
established directly. The simulation result in paper [21]
shows this approach greatly improves the peer/resource
lookup efficiency, especially in the stable overlay where
peers do not join/left the overlay in high frequency.
The hierarchical model could be also an enhancement, e.g.
two-layer overlay model proposed in [22, 23] and k-layer
model proposed in [24, 25]. The idea is to select relatively
powerful and stable peers for the upper layer, and relatively
weaker and unstable peers for the lower layer. This approach
makes the system more scalable, and guarantees the peer/
resource lookup in the higher overlay layer.
4 P2PSIP session initiation
4.1 Enrollment and bootstrap
When a new user wants to join the P2PSIP overlay for the
first time, enrollment procedure need to be initiated. One
possible approach is to use a central enrollment server, from
which the new peer learn the particular overlay network,
including the overlay algorithm, type of credentials re-
quired, address of credential servers, a list of bootstrap
peers, etc. These parameters are encapsulated into an XML
file and sent from enrollment server to the peer. Based on
overlay parameters, the peer chooses the corresponding
handling mechanisms. For instance, if the credential is
needed for security reason, the peer has to send its public
key to a particular credential server for generating user
certificate (described in Section 4). Enrollment server also
informs the policy of being a peer in the overlay. For
example, the peer should have enough CPU processing
power, bandwidth and should be able to make contributions
(e.g. cooperative routing, storage, etc) to the other peers.
Fig. 4 Message flow
Fig. 3 Direct connection
Fig. 2 Chord storage
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Bootstrap takes place every time when the peer boots.
The bootstrap peers are a set of static peers collected by the
enrollment server. Their mission is to help the joining peer
to find its neighbors (successors) in the overlay. Bootstrap
peer is the first contact point for a joining peer.
4.2 NAT traversal
Network Address Translators (NAT) provides benefits as
well as drawbacks. One main drawback is that NAT is not
friendly for connection establishment between two end-
points. In order to solve this problem, STUN1/TURN2/
ICE3-based approaches [26, 27] are proposed. STUN
approach uses a STUN server in the middle of two
endpoints to learn the NAT status (e.g. existence of NAT,
NAT type, public endpoint address, port, etc). With these
information, two endpoints might be able to establish the
session directly. However, STUN approach does not work
in symmetric NAT where each connection is mapped to a
specific IP address and port. One possible solution is to use
a TURN server to relay data traffic during the connection
and transmission. ICE combines the usage of STUN and
TURN approaches. It firstly selects STUN for handling,
while turns to TURN if STUN is not available. Besides,
ICE supports the negotiation of session establishment (e.g.
latency, jitter measurement, error handling, best route, etc)
between two endpoints.
Another approach is based on Universal Plug and Play
(UPnP) [28, 29], pushed by Microsoft. In this solution,
client queries the NAT via “UPnP asking”, asking what
mapping it should use if it wants to receive on a certain
port. The NAT responds with the IP and port pair that can
be reached from public internet. Today, more and more
internet gateway vendors offer the support of UPnP
protocol, which makes this technology quite promising for
P2PSIP communication systems.
4.3 Message routing
P2PSIP message flow in overlay network should comply
with a few routing styles, for instance, Iterative, Recursive,
and Semi-Recursive [6]. The implementation of these
mechanisms in P2PSIP environment should consider
different technical environments, such as NAT Traversal
(in Section 4.2), security (Section 5), etc.
In Iterative routing, source peer is redirected by each
intermediate peer to the destination, as shown in Fig. 5. In
Recursive routing, the request is forwarded hop by hop by
each intermediate peer until the destination. The response
follows the same route back to the source (See Fig. 6). Another
routing is Semi-Recursive routing, the compromise of two
routing styles above. In this approach, request message is
forwarded by intermediate peers hop by hop to the destination,
while the response is directly returned (See Fig. 7).
In interactive routing, source peer is able to check the
validity and correctness of each response. It might be
implemented in security sensitive environment. However, this
solution does not provide guarantee for NAT traversal when
the destination peer is behind NAT protection. Recursive
routing has little trouble in NAT traversal; however, it might
cause long delay due to lots of message flows. Therefore, this
approach is only suggested for high capability overlay (e.g.
more CPU processing power, high bandwidth, etc). The third
approach has no problem in NAT traversal and system delay.
Also, it provides better security than Recursive routing since
the response is directly forwarded to the source peer. This
approach is capable to be implemented in the environment
that needs NAT traversal, lower latency, and better security.
Fig. 5 Iterative routing
3 ICE: Interactive Connectivity Establishment.
2 TURN: Traversal Using Relay NAT.
1 STUN: Simple Traversal of User Datagram Protocol through NATs.
Fig. 6 Recursive routing
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4.4 Interworking
Paper [30] proposes an “super peer” based hierarchical
architecture for interconnection among different P2PSIP
domains/overlays. In order to have inter-domain connectivity,
every domain should have at least one “super peer”, which is
the stable peer owning high system capability (e.g. CPU,
bandwidth, etc). These super peers connect each other to form
an upper layer overlay, which provide helps when connection
is needed between peers among different P2PSIP domain.
P2PSIP should also handle the interconnection with
future All-IP networks (e.g. SIP or IP Multimedia Subsys-
tem (IMS) based network). A possible system architecture
is suggested in [31], in which a Gateway Application
Server (AS) is proposed as the key interworking unit
between two different network (See Fig. 8). Gateway AS
acts as an ordinary P2PSIP peer in P2PSIP network and an
IMS Application Server in IMS network.
4.5 P2PSIP client
A special type of P2PSIP entity, called “P2PSIP client”, is
now discussed by IETF P2PSIP Working Group. P2PSIP
client is the devices that participate in the overlay but do
not make contribution (e.g. routing, storage, etc) due to lack
of coherent support in the overlay algorithm or limited
capability (e.g. energy, bandwidth, CPU processing power,
etc). One possible approach [11] is to define a separate
client protocol for the association between P2PSIP client
and an associated peer in the overlay. The associated peer
acts as relay proxy for P2PSIP client to send out P2PSIP
messages and receive the corresponding response.
5 Security challenges
P2PSIP system security could be divided into three parts:
authentication and authorization, trust management, and
transport security. Firstly, a peer must be authenticated and
authorized. Then, trust management is responsible to build
trust relationship among communication parties. Finally,
transport security protects the confidentiality, integrity and
availability in data transmission. In this section, we identify
security problems and review a few proposed solutions.
5.1 Security problems
The decentralization of P2PSIP network comes to the cost
of reduced management capability and control that results
in security problems. Some possible problems are listed
below (according to [12, 32]):
& Impersonation: an intermediate malicious peer might
misroute, discard and temper the received data traffic.
& Sybil attack: an attacker could join the overlay with
different identities and control a part of the overlay.
& Eclipse attack: intermediate peers can conspire to hijack
and dominate the neighbor set of correct peers by
controlling the data traffic through routing.
& Partition attack: a malicious bootstrap peer might
provide wrong information to the joining peer and
prevent the normal joining process.
& Replay attack: a malicious peer may resend the older
message, trying to replace the newer data with the old
information.
& Eavesdropping: an intermediate peer can passively
record activities of the other peers in the network. For
example, it can record the activities of the neighbors,
when they register, who they are calling, etc.
& DoS attack: a malicious peer could launch a DoS attack
against one or more peers to consume computing resource.
& SPAM: even worse than the email SPAM, P2PSIP-based
phone might ring at any time.
5.2 PKI-based certificate
Public Key infrastructure (PKI) based certificate is
supposed to be implemented [33]. Certificate proves the
existence and legitimacy of the specific peer so that the
communication session is trustful and precise. In addi-
tional to a few basic elements (e.g. version number,Fig. 8 P2PSIP-IMS interconnecting architecture
Fig. 7 Semi-recursive routing
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signature algorithm, digital signature of the issuer, etc),
P2PSIP peer certificate might include P2PSIP related
information: peer specific ID and one or more user names
(e.g. alice@operator.com, etc). Public and private keys are
used to handle the task of encryption, decryption, and
digital signature.
5.3 Pre-shared-key approach
In the closed networks, Pre-Shared Key (PSK) approach
might be more convenient. In cryptography, Pre-Shared
Key is a symmetric key shared among the peers before
establishing secure connections. The secret or key can be
a password like “hElLo#QWoRld”, a passphrase like “Wo
ai ni”, or a hexadecimal string like “AUS30209-
DOP745”.
Using Pre-Shared Key can help to avoid the heavy work
of certificate based operations. Also, it is more convenient
to configure a PSK in closed environments. However, it is
weak to the DoS attack when an attacker initiates a large
amount of exchange key requests to consume the comput-
ing resources.
5.4 Trust-based security enhancement
A typical example of trust-based security enhancement is to
implement reputation system [34]. A reputation system
collects, distributes, and aggregates feedback about partic-
ipants’ past behavior. In this approach, the reputation is
represented in a discrete trust value (e.g. 1 represents
positive reputation and 0 represents negative reputation).
The reputation is earned by contribution, for instance,
relaying data traffic, acting as the STUN server, etc. A peer
with sufficient trust value means it behaves well and is
trustworthy, while a malicious peer that experience negative
behavior will probably have a low trust value, and thus is
not trustworthy.
Another novel approach is based on subjective logic,
proposed in [35]. The subjective logic defines the term
opinion ω = {t, d, u}, in which t, d and u correspond to
trust, distrust, and uncertainty respectively. Subjective logic
also defines logical operators for combining opinions. For
example, the recommendation operator ⊗ can be introduced
to evaluate the trust model of p which might be a statement
like “the message traverse from A to B is unchanged results
of measurement”, as following:
wABp ¼ wAB  wBp ¼ tABp ; dABp ; uABp
n o
Paper [36] implements this approach for the enhance-
ment of P2PSIP security. Suppose that a request goes
through the source peer A, intermediate peers B1, B2, Bn-1,
and ended in the destination peer Bn. By applying the rules
of subjective logic recommendation, the trustworthiness of
this data flow is:
wAB1B2...Bn1Bnp ¼ wAB1  wB1B2  wB2B3  . . . wBn1Bn  wBnp
Therefore, by mathematic calculation, it is possible to
evaluate the trust level for each message flow.
5.5 Proxy based security
A possible architecture that provides the secure service for
P2PSIP communication systems is proposed in [37, 38].
The proposed architecture contains three main parts:
P2PSIP Peer, Resource, Chord Secure Proxy (CSP), as
shown in Fig. 9. For locating a peer/resource in the overlay,
the source peer first sends the P2PSIP request to a specific
CSP (Step 1). The CSP acts as a proxy server to probe the
destination peer through multicasting a “Hello” message to
its successors through Chord algorithm. When the destina-
tion peer receives a “Hello” message, it contacts the CSP to
catch the original P2PSIP request (Step 2). After that, the
connection between source and destination peers can be
established (Step 3).
The connections in the system architecture are SSL/TLS
secured. The “Hello” multicast mechanism (in Step 2)
firstly makes sure that intermediate peers are incapable to
receive original P2PSIP request, and secondly guarantees in
some level that destination peer could receive at least one
“Hello” message. Therefore, this architecture provides the
secure P2PSIP session initiation.
6 Conclusion and open issues
In this paper, we consider the P2PSIP paradigm in
communication systems. We make a survey on the current
Fig. 9 Architecture overview [37]
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approaches implemented/proposed in academia and indus-
try. What we considered in the survey is: Chord-based
P2PSIP overlay, P2PSIP session initiation (e.g. enrollment
and bootstrap, NAT traversal, message routing, interwork-
ing issues, P2PSIP client, etc) and security challenges.
However, the research of P2PSIP is still far from mature. A
lot of open questions are waiting for the urgent answer.
Firstly, although there are a few proposals discussing
P2PSIP interworking issue, much more should be done to
test and evaluate the availability and efficiency. Besides, the
interworking between P2PSIP and conventional PSTN
network should be further studied.
Secondly, IETF P2PSIP WG is still discussing the need
of client protocol and how efficient it could work in reality.
An Internet-browser based approach (described in [39])
might be an alternative solution.
Thirdly, the security mechanisms proposed are not
enough. For instance, there is no efficient protection against
the security problems such as DoS attack and SPAM
(described in Section 5.1).
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